Two neural networks which are trained on their mutual output bits show a novel phenomenon: The networks synchronize to a state with identical time dependent weights.
INTRODUCTION
Neural networks learn from examples. This concept has extensively been investigated using models and methods of statistical mechanics [I, 21. A "teacher" network is presenting input/ourput pairs of high dimensional data., and a "student" network is being trained on these data. Training means, that synaptic weights adopt by simple rules to the input/output pairs. After the training phase the student is able to generalize: It can classify -with some probabilityan input pattern which did not belong to the training set.
Training is a dynamic process. The examples are generated step by step by a static networkthe teacher. The student tries to move towards the teacher. It turns out, that for a large class of models the dynamics of learning and generalization can be described by ordinary differential equations for a few order parameters [3] .
Recently this scenario has been extended to the case of a dynamic teacher: Both of the communicating networks receive an identical input vector, generate an output bit and are trained on the corresponding bit of their partner. The analytic solution shows a novel phenomenon: synchronization by mutual leaming [4]. The synaptic weights of the two networks relax to a common identical weight vector which still depends on time. The biological consequences of this phenomenon are not explored, yet, but an interesting application in cryptography has been found: secure generation of a secret key over a public channel [6] .
In the field of cryptography, one is interested in methods to transmit secret messages between two partners A and B.
An opponent E who is able to listen to the communication should not be able to recover the secret message.
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Minerva Center and Department of Physics Bar-Ilan University 52100 Ramat-Gan, Israel Before 1976, all cryptographic methods had to rely on secret keys for encryption which were transmitted between A and B over a secret channel not accessible to any opponent. Such a common secret key can be used, for example, as a seed for a random bit generator by which the bit sequence of the message is added (modulo 2).
In 1976, however, Diffie and Hellmann found that a common secret key could be created over a public channel accessible to any opponent. This method is based on number theory: Given limited computer power, it is not possible to calculate the discrete logarithm of sufficiently large numbers [7).
Here we show how neural networks can produce a common secret key by exchanging bits over a public channel and by leaming from each other [6, 8, 9] .
TRAINING THE TREE PARITY MACHINE
Both of the communicating partners A and B are using a multilayer network with K hidden units: A tree parity machine, as shown in figure l. In this paper we use K=3, only. Each network consists of three units (perceptrons, i=1,2,3):
The w are N-dimensional vectors of synaptic weights and the x are N-dimensional input vectors. Here we discuss discrete weights and inputs, only:
The three hidden bits U are combined to an output bit T of each network:
The two output bits r are used for the mutual training process. At each training step the two machines A and B receive identical input vectors x1,x2,x3. The training algorithm is the following: Only if the two output bits are identical, T~ = T', the weights can be changed. In this X Figure 1 : Parity machine with three hidden units. case, only the hidden unit ai which is identical to T changes its weights using the Hebbian rule In the first case, all three weight vectors wl; w2, W Q are changed, in all other three cases only one weight vector is changed. The partner as well as any opponent does not know which one of the weight vectors is updated.
Note that the two multilayer networks may be considered as a system of random walks with reflecting houndaries. Each of the 6N components wi,j of the weight vectors moves on 2L+ 1 lattice points. w,,j makes a step zi,j = i 1 if the corresponding global signals T and U allow this. If it hits a boundary it is reflected. Since any two weights wej agd wfj receive an identical input xi+ every common step where one component is reflected decreases the distance between the two weights. As we will &e in the following section, this finally results in identical weight vectors. 
GENERATION OF SECRET KEYS
ing. In fact, it is hard to distinguish this motion form a random walk in weight space [5] . Therefore the two multilayer networks perform a kind of synchronized random walk in the discrete space of (2L + l ) 3 N points. Compared to algorithms b&ed on number theory, the. neural algorithm has several adviintages: First, it is very simple. The training algorithm is essentially a linear filter which can easily implemented in hardware. Second, the number of calculation? to generate the key is low. To generate a key of length N one needs of the orde;of N computational steps. Third, for every communication, or even for every block of the message, a new key can be generated. No secret information has to be stored for a longer time.
But useful keys have to be sicure. An attacker E who is recording the communication between A and B should not be able to calculate the secret key. Attacker will be discussed in the following.
ATTACKS
A secure key exchange protocol should have the following property: Any attacker who knows all of the details of the protocol and all of the information exchanged between A and B should not have the computational power to calculate the secret key.
We assume that the attacker E knows the algorithm, the sequence of input vectors and the sequence of output bits.
In principle, E could start from all of the (2L + l)3N initial weight vectors and calculate the ones which are consistent with the input/output sequence. It has been shown, that all of these initial states move towards the same final weight vector, the key is unique [lo]. However, this task is computationally infeasible.
Hence one has to find an algorithm which tries to adapt to the known input/output. Note that the training rule for A and B has the property: If a pair of units is synchron it remains so forever. The synchronous state is an attractor of the leaming dynamics. Any algorithm for the attacker E should have this property, too.
An immediate guess for a possible attack is the following: E uses the same algorithm as one of the partners, say B. If rA = rB the weight vectors of E are changed for which the unit U? is identical to rA.
In fact, numerical simulations as well as analytic calculations show that an attacker E will synchronize with A and B after some learning time t1,,,, [6, 8, 91 . However, the learning time is much longer than the synchronization time. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the ratio between synchronization and learning times. On average, leaming is about 1000 times slower than synchronization. But even the tail of the distribution never exceeded the factor 10 (for 1000 runs). Therefore, if the training process is stopped shortly after synchronization, the attacker has no chance to calculate the key. The key is secure for this algorithm of attack.
Why does this work at all? What is the difference between the partner B and the attacker E, who both have the same information? The reason is that B can influence the network A whereas E can only Listen. Synchronization as well as leaming is a competition of attraction and repulsion controlled by the output bits. One can show, for the parity machine the probability for repulsion is much larger for E than for A and B, at least close to synchronization. This is not true for the committee nor the simple perceptron[7, 91. However, one cannot exclude that E finds attacks which perform better than the simple attack described above. In fact, recently several attacks were found which seem to crack the key exchange[l I]. The most successful one has two additional ingredients: First, an ensemble of attackers is used.
Second. E makes additional training steps when A and B are quiet, r A # rB. An ensemble is helpful if the distribution of learning times is broad. Then there may be a chance that some of, say 10OO0, attackers will synchronize before A and B. If one reads all of the 10000 encrypted messages one will detect the key from those messages which have a meaning.
The additional training step goes as follows: If rE # r A search for the unit with smallest internal field wf . xi, flip the corresponding U : and proceed with training as above. This step enforces learning by changing only the information which is close to the decision boundary. This algorithm succeeds to find the key for the value L = 3. There is a nonzero fraction P ( L ) of attackers which synchronize with the two partners A and B [I I]. However, a detailed numerical calculation of the scaling of key generation showed that this fraction P ( L ) decreases exponentially fast with the number L of weight values[ 121. The synchronization time, on the other hand, increases only l i e L2, as expected form the random walk analogy. Therefore, in the limit of sufficiently large values of L neural cryptography is secure.
In addition, it has been shown that key generation by mutual learning can be made even more secnre by comhining it with synchronization of chaotic maps[l3].
SUMMARY
Interacting neural networks are able to synchronize. Starting from random initial weights and leaming from each other, two multilayer networks relax to a state with time dependent identical synaptic weights.
This scenario has been applied to cryptography. Two partners A and B can generate a secret key over a public channel by training their parity machines on the output bits of their partner. A and B did not exchange any information overa secret channelbefore their communication. Although an attacker can record !he communication and knows the algorithm she is not able to calculate the secret common key which A and B use for encryption. This holds for all attackers studied so far. Of course, one cannot prove that no algorithms exist for a successful attack.
Future has to show whether neural cryptography remains secure for more advanced attacks.
To our knowledge, neural cryptography is the fist algorithm for key generation over public channels which is not based on number theory. It has several advantages over known protocols: It is fast and simple, for each messages a new key can he used and no information is stored permanently. Therefore neural cryptography may lead to novel applications in the future. (2001) [6] I. Kanter, W. K m e l and E. Kanter, Secure exchange of information by synchronization of neural networks, Europhys. Lett. 57,141-147 (2002) [7] b. R. Stinson, Cryptography: Theory and Practice (CRC Press 1995) . .
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